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TO:

DLAAP-BA
ROOM 1C942
THE PENTAGON

FROM: PAUL V. WALSH
DD/OER
ROOM 4F-18 Hqs.

We have reviewed your latest draft and can agree with it if the following changes can be made:

Paragraph 1.a. Maneuver Units, COMMENT: line 3, delete the phrase "...at least in an estimate."

Last sentence: delete everything after "...either nationally or by corps area."

Paragraph 1.c. Administrative Services, COMMENT: We suggest the following substitute for your paragraph:

The new definition allows the inclusion of front administrative service personnel, and administrative service units serving in border areas, including troops subordinate to out-of-country headquarters but operating in areas under the jurisdiction of the headquarters listed above. The definition is interpreted as allowing for estimates of unidentified administrative services when the evidential base and judgment so indicate.


Paragraph 2.d. We suggest the following restatement of this question:

To what extent does the current infrastructure strength reported by MACV exclude personnel listed in ICBSX totals of eliminations?

Paragraph 3: Revise 1st sentence to read: It is obvious the need exists for all parties to work out a coordinated definition of the "insurgency base."

The purpose of this insertion is to make it clear that the definition of the insurgency base is not exclusively a MACV/ICBSX concern but must reflect DIA/CIA interests.

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PROPOSED CHANGES TO 1967 CINCPAC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE OB DEFINITIONS

1(C) The following definitional changes have been proposed by the DIA/CTA working group:

a. Maneuver Units

(Old) Maneuver Units: Infantry, armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements of platoon level upward regardless of subordination.

(New) Maneuver Units: Infantry, armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements serving at district level and above.

COMMENT: Guerrilla platoons could erroneously be included as maneuver units under the old definition. The new definition would preclude this and allow for consideration of small units presently not included in the order of battle summary even though in some areas they exist. There is no absolute requirement for a detailed listing by unit designator in the order of battle, and their inclusion in an estimate must, of course, be dependent upon the best evidential base and analytical judgment. A single strength figure as an estimate should be a separate part of the OB summary or transmitted separately.

b. Combat Support

(Old) Combat Support Units: Fire support, air defense and technical service units organized at battalion level and above, and not classified under administrative

service. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support.

(New) Combat Support Units: Fire support and air defense units at district level and above, and technical service units subordinate to divisions and regiments.

COMMENT: New definition would enable the inclusion of technical service companies and smaller units supporting divisions and regiments, as combat support elements. OB bookkeeping would necessitate separating the Headquarters and Support listings under divisions and regiments into maneuver and combat support whereas present listings carry the total for Headquarters and Support in these elements as maneuver. Consideration was given to including the technical elements under fronts as combat support but we believe these more rightfully fall under Administrative Services.

c. Administrative Services

(Old) Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military sub-region, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters.

(New) Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in COSVN, military region, military sub-region

front, province, district, city, and area staffs, and rear service and technical units of all type directly subordinate to those headquarters.

COMMENT: The new definition allows the inclusion of front administrative service personnel and administering. Service units serving in border areas including troops subordinate to out-of-country headquarters but operation in areas under the jurisdiction of the headquarters listed above. The definition is interpreted as allowing for estimates of unidentified administrative services when the evidential base and judgment so indicates.

d. Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF)

(Old) Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, or sub-region.

(New) Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, military sub-region, or front.

COMMENT: New definition merely adds clarity; it would appear to have no effect on the OB or estimates.

e. Viet Cong (VC) Local Forces (LF)

(Old) Those military units which are directly

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subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

(New) Those military units which are directly subordinate to province, district, city, and area party committees and normally operate within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective control headquarters.

COMMENT: Generally no effect on OB accounting; merely adds clarity.

f. Guerrillas

(Old) Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

(New) Guerrillas include platoons, squads, and cells, both overt and secret, directly subordinate to the party apparatus at village and hamlet levels. Village guerrillas are relatively well-armed and usually full-time, while hamlet guerrillas are usually part-time and partially armed.

COMMENT: The new definition is more definitive than the old. It is not expected that MACV should attempt to break out village, hamlet and secret guerrillas unless information becomes available. The term full-time is interpreted as meaning those forces who are

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permanent members of the guerrilla force, even though they engage in other occupations, and routinely operate in an offensive role away from their immediate home areas.

2. (S) It was generally agreed that the existing definition for Viet Cong infrastructure is satisfactory so far as it goes; however, because of the broad interpretation that can be affixed to the definition, it is not considered suitable for the present accounting purposes. For example, the infrastructure strength now reported, which is agreed by all concerned to represent only a selected portion of the total, does not conform to the current definition of infrastructure which is all-inclusive. The purpose of the definition needs re-examination to determine whether it should show the full complement of personnel or only those of some specified significance. We tend to support the latter, but think that a change in definition alone would not solve the matter. Since the matter concerns ICEX, we think that J-2 MACV and ICEX should review it initially. Discussion might include the following:

a. The infrastructure strength by echelon, job description, and rank -- general accounting procedure.

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b. A determination of that portion of the infrastructure considered essential for its continued existence and effectiveness.

c. The infrastructure strength as a base for attrition -- how large a base should the ICEX successes be measured against.

d. To what extent does the current infrastructure strength reported by MACV exclude personnel listed in ICEX totals of eliminations?

COMMENT: Dependent on your deliberations, possibly a breakout of the infrastructure is appropriate to identify first, the hard core or those who need to be eliminated to insure success of the pacification programs and second, an identification or estimate of the remaining less-important members of the political arm. These latter could be considered as part of the insurgency base (see paragraph 3 below)

3. (S) It is obvious the need exists for all parties to work out a coordinated definition of the "insurgency base." It need not appear in the OB summary, but is needed in support of estimates primarily to express recognition of those elements which are not truly a military threat and, therefore, have no place in OB, but nonetheless exist as part of the organized Communist intrusion in SVN. It would include elements such as Self Defense, Assault Youth, and portions of the political/administrative apparatus not reported as Infrastructure.